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Academic Community and Policymaking in Russia
Impact or Detachment?
Katarzyna Kaczmarska
Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales, UK
This paper is concerned with the role of International Relations (IR) expertise and the
academia–policy nexus in contemporary Russia. Drawing on interviews with Russia-based
scholars, it posits that while there exist formal channels of knowledge diffusion between
academia and the state, there is no clear-cut relationship between knowledge produced in
academia and the uses of this knowledge by the state. Scholars’ attitudes towards policy
impact, while generally skeptical, span a broad spectrum. Some are convinced that achieving
impact is impossible, some declare unwillingness to interact with the policymaking world,
while others find providing expert advice difficult but possible under certain conditions.
INTRODUCTION
English-language political science has developed a wide range
of theories conceptualizing the relationship between academic
knowledge and policymaking.1 In the discipline of
International Relations (IR), Christian Bueger (2014),
Bentley Allan (2017), Lorenzo Zambernardi (2016), and
Beate Jahn (2017) provide a comprehensive recapitulation of
the main arguments driving the debate about the knowledge–
policy nexus. One of its features is the recent emergence of
“impact” and “political relevance” as concepts animating
research. The formalization of the impact agenda among the
assessment criteria of scholarly work (Bastow, Dunleavy, and
Tinkler 2013; Ní Mhurchú et al. 2016; Smith, Ward, and
House 2011) increasingly normalizes the thinking about soci-
etal impact as an element of scholarly practice in the discipline
of IR. Academics are asked to describe the impact of their
work, for instance, as part of the British Research Evaluation
Framework, and when applying for major EU-level funding or
International Studies Association (ISA) grants.2
Advocates of tighter links between academia and the
policymaking world (e.g., Bertucci and Lowenthal 2014;
Biersteker 2014; Lowenthal and Bertucci 2014) point to
the benefits of bridging the gap between scholars and pol-
icymakers, and discuss opportunities for fruitful collabora-
tion and mutually enriching exchange in specific policy
areas (Bertucci and Lowenthal 2014). The literature consid-
ers interactions between scholars and policymakers in inter-
national affairs as potentially productive, even if not always
successful (Biersteker 2014). This appraisal is challenged by
those who see numerous limitations to knowledge exchange
between academia and the policy world. In the foreign-
policy-analysis literature such limitations have been debated
at least since the early 1990s (Avey and Desch 2014;
Byman and Kroenig 2016; George 1993; Newsom 1995;
Walt 2005). More recently, the growing political polariza-
tion, a distorted market of ideas, and distrust in public
institutions, including universities, have nourished the thesis
about the eroding authority of traditional sources of foreign-
policy expertise (Drezner 2017).
So far, policy impact and the broader theme of a knowl-
edge–policy nexus have generated little attention in the
contemporary Russian-language literature or in English-lan-
guage studies dedicated to Russia.3 Despite unrelenting
interest in Russian domestic governance and foreign policy,
including a debate on the pages of this journal (Charap and
Welt 2015; Laruelle 2015), there exists a clear gap in the
understanding of the role of the academic community in
policymaking in Russia. Inquiries into the contemporary
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role of news media suggest that media narratives amplify
the official discourse (Szostek 2017); we know less about
the place and significance of academic expertise.
Russian foreign policymaking is often described as hav-
ing a “shadowy side” (Baev 2018), and while the inner
workings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the
Presidential Administration are without doubt difficult to
untangle for an outside observer, there are important inroads
into the topic. The existing debate on the role of expertise in
Russia’s foreign policymaking focuses mainly on the think-
tank environment and its institutional development
(Efremenko 2017; Pallin and Oxenstierna 2017). One ave-
nue that has not yet been sufficiently explored is scholars’
own assessments of their role in the policymaking process.
This approach allows us to engage with statements about the
excessive centralization and isolation of foreign policymak-
ing. An additional advantage is that analysis of the acade-
mia–policy nexus offers a window into political and social
developments in contemporary Russia.4
This article analyzes scholars’ own take on the question of
policy impact. It explores Russian academic views concerning
the limitations and possibilities of contributing to the foreign-
policy-making process as well as institutional incentives and
disincentives for policy impact. On the basis of in-depth empiri-
cal research comprising forty interviews, conducted in the years
2016–2018, with scholars employed at different universities and
various institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) in
Moscow and St. Petersburg in the social sciences and huma-
nities, I show that the relationship between the state and aca-
demic expertise is more complex than that portrayed by existing
literature on Russia (Lo 2015; Makarychev and Morozov 2013;
Omelicheva and Zubytska 2016).5
I acknowledge that the method of semi-structured interviews
has its material limitations and its results reflect most closely on
the interlocutors and localities available to me at the time of
carrying out this research. The method, however, has proved
useful in research concerning knowledge production (Müller
and de Rijcke 2017; Stevens, Miller-Idriss, and Shami 2018, 3)
and policy processes (Owen and Bindman 2017). I conducted
the semi-structured, face-to-face interviews in either Russian or
English.6 The interviewees were selected by analyzing faculty
members’ and RAS employees’ profiles available on institu-
tional webpages and subsequently by means of a snow-ball
method. About 15 percent of contacted scholars did not respond
to the interview request, and some declined participation. The
interview involved asking about motivation to do specific
research; experience of delivering the results of research to
policymakers; and individual assessment of the potential rele-
vance and usefulness of research to foreign-policy-making
communities.
Methodological debate concerning interview-based research,
including interviews with experts (Bogner, Littig, and Menz
2009; Gläser and Laudel 2009), suggests that interviewees, for
various reasons, may wish to withhold information (Napier
2010). However, a bigger pool of respondents and their varied
localization (in terms of cities, institutions, and disciplines)
should alleviate the fallout. In the prevalent majority of cases,
my impression was that scholars sympathized with the process
of collecting data and did their very best to share their experi-
ences and assessments. The size of the interview sample allowed
me to analyze interview data without resorting to specialized
software. I searched for common themes and approaches. My
aim was to derive classifications from interviews rather than
attempt to fit data into pre-existing categories derived from
literature on foreign-policy making. This choice was motivated
by the fact that most of this literature comments on democratic
states, while my intention was to be attuned to the specific
sociopolitical context of the research–policy nexus in Russia.
So as not to overlook the contribution of the existing literature, in
the concluding section I offer a comparison of this article’s
findings with studies on foreign-policy decision-making in the
United States.
The article posits that while there exist some formal
channels of knowledge diffusion between academia and
the Russian state, there is no clear-cut relationship between
knowledge produced in academia and the uses of this
knowledge by the state. Two concurrent trends can be
identified in the relationship between the academic commu-
nity and the policymaking world. On the one hand, autho-
rities expect Russian universities to upgrade their position in
the international rankings and to participate in the global
education and publishing market. On the other hand, the
academic community perceives that professional expertise
in international relations is not valued by policymakers.
While some scholars recognize that their expertise may
influence the policymaking process to some extent, pro-
vided that they identify the right topic, time, and level of
engagement, others see their role as highly curtailed.
The article develops in several steps. First, I introduce the
contemporary political context that affects the production of
academic expertise. I outline what I identified as the state’s
contradictory goals in its approach to the development of aca-
demic research and teaching. Next, I show the range of scholarly
views on their potential contribution to foreign-policy making. I
conclude with a reflection on the paradox of requiring univer-
sities to excel and the undervaluing of academic expertise.
THE STATE’S CONTRADICTORY GOALS
The approach the Russian government takes toward universi-
ties and academic research ismarked by several contradictions.
On the one hand, the state recurrently displays official mes-
sages of concern for the well-being of the academic
community.7 State officials confirm that scholarly knowledge
is valued and should be developed.8 Government-sponsored
initiatives have been launched to assist universities in climbing
international university rankings, in particular the Russian
Academic Excellence Project “5–100.” One of the project’s
stated aims is the “production of world-class intellectual
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products.”9 The expected result, to be achieved by 2020, is for
at least five universities from the list of 21 project participants
to enter the top 100 of the internationally recognized rankings:
the Times Higher Education, Quacquarelli Symonds, and
Academic Ranking of World Universities. The promotion of
the higher-education sector has become an element of public
diplomacy and a symbol of Russia’s international status
(Mäkinen 2016). There are also a number of channels that in
theory facilitate the diffusion of knowledge between academia
and the state. On the other hand, the state’s indirect interference
with academic research has increased over the last decade and
there has been less tolerance for criticism directed at Russia’s
foreign policy.
Unlike China, Turkey, or Tajikistan,10 the Russian gov-
ernment has not openly stepped up its efforts to control
research. There are no unambiguous signs of violating aca-
demic independence. However, relative freedom of the
1990s and early 2000s has been decreasing since the poli-
tical turmoil of 2011–2012 and following the 2014 Russian–
Ukrainian conflict (Gel’man 2015). Greater state control in
contemporary Russia—which encompasses, inter alia, the
tendency to limit citizens’ freedoms (Lasnier 2017;
Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, and Henry 2018; Wilkinson 2014),
stifle protest activity (Bogush 2017; Shulman 2017; van der
Vet 2017), and punish activists, journalists and bloggers
(Roache 2017); increased interference in the world of mass
media (Etkind 2015), art, and culture;11 tighter surveillance
of private entrepreneurship (Economist 2017); rising
secrecy of national spending (Movchan 2017; Tkachov
2017; Tkachov and Makarov 2017)—all have impacted
the broader sociopolitical setting in which academic knowl-
edge production takes place.
In addition to this increasingly difficult context, there
appeared several legislative obstacles to research. For
instance, the 2012 Law on Foreign Agents had the effect
of undermining the authority of several research organiza-
tions, such as the Levada Center and the Center for
Independent Social Research. In addition, the law intro-
duced uncertainty and insecurity by defining actions aimed
at influencing the government or public opinion as “political
activity,” a concept that is left deliberately vague.12 While
universities have not been targeted by this law, such framing
has the effect of discouraging impact-oriented research.
Apart from implicit obstacles, there have been several
instances when different state actors interfered directly with
academic activities. For instance, in 2016, the European
University at St. Petersburg (EUSP) lost its license to con-
duct educational activities and in 2018 state accreditation
was withdrawn for the Moscow School of Social and
Economic Sciences (Shaninka). While the EUSP regained
its license in July 2018, it remains without state accredita-
tion. The reasons behind both universities' problems are
unclear. In addition to the culture of distrust and bureau-
cratic oversight, the independent thinking and critical
research pursued at these institutions may have contributed
to their being subjected to pressure. The EUSP has been
described by scholars as an “exemplary victim” (R27) and
as an instance of systematic discrimination against private
research universities by the Russian state (Guba and
Zavadskaia 2017).
The state has not only confronted institutions, but also
individual scholars. These cases have been ascribed to
scholars’ political non-conformity or critical attitude toward
Russia’s authorities or Russia’s foreign policy. Sergei
Guriev, rector of the Moscow New Economic School, who
helped write a report criticizing the prosecution of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, left Russia for an academic career in France
in 2013. The following year, Andrei Zubov, philosophy
professor at the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations (MGIMO University), was dismissed after com-
paring Russia’s annexation of Crimea to Nazi Germany’s
Anschluss of Austria in 1938.13 Even if these cases are
infrequent and there has been no coordinated effort to
undermine academic freedom, the signals sent by various
state institutions may be interpreted by scholars as a warn-
ing that critical engagement with the policymaking process
is not welcomed.
In liberal democracies, the dissemination of research
results to non-academic audiences is considered an impor-
tant element of generating impact. In contemporary Russia,
this process, too, is hampered. Institutions loyal to the state,
such as state television channels, have been interfering with
communicating research to the broader public.14
In the realm of the social sciences and humanities, the
disciplines in which scholars have most potential for
informing foreign policy, the state’s absence creates an
additional disincentive for policy engagement. One example
is the Presidential Award for Young Scholars in the Field of
Science and Innovations. Established in 2008, it is meant to
recognize outstanding scholarly work. However, since its
inception, only two scholars have received it for work in the
humanities and social sciences. In 2018, Andrei Fursenko,
presidential advisor, noted that it was difficult to find “valu-
able work” in the humanities, a comment that testifies to a
very limited, yet judgmental and excessively critical
engagement of bureaucrats with academic production.15
In the realm of the so-called “mega grants” the Russian
government awards for research projects, which last up to
three years with a budget of up to 90 million rubles (US$1.5
million), the situation is only slightly better. In 2017, out of
35 mega-grants, only two were awarded in the humanities
and social sciences.16 In addition, the community of social
science researchers was disappointed by the decision taken
in 2016 to merge the fund for sponsoring research in social
sciences and humanities, the Russian Humanist Scientific
Fund (Rossiiskii gumanitarnyi nauchnyi fond, RGNF) with
the Russian Fund for Basic Research (Rossiiskii fond fun-
damental’nykh issledovanii, RFFI).
Institutional arrangements and career advancement rules
in Russian academia are not designed to mobilize scholars
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to do policy-relevant research or to seek dissemination of
their research results beyond academia, as the following
excerpts from interviews show:
In our grant system, there is no such expectation for research
to have policy impact. The main goal is to gain knowledge,
provide theoretical input. Knowledge should be practical,
but not political. (R28)
One significant obstacle for research to reach policy-makers
is the lack or unpopularity of a policy paper format. The
second factor is the lack of motivation structure for aca-
demics to be policy-relevant or to work with impact. (R5)
The first statement shows there is weariness with regard to
research and/or its dissemination that may be interpreted as
having a political agenda. The second points mainly to
institutional obstacles, in particular the lack of an adequate
reward system (compare Forrat 2016).
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COOPERATION
Factors that discourage scholars from active participation in
the public debate and from engagement with the foreign-
policy-making process appear to stand in stark contrast to
the relatively rich institutional setting for knowledge
exchange between expert community and the government.
The opening of the political system after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union made it possible to establish a number
of IR research and teaching centers beyond the capital. In
the Soviet period, Russian IR was limited to a handful of
centers in Moscow, including the Moscow State Institute of
International Relations (MGIMO), and the Russian
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO), Institute of the US and
Canada (ISKAN), and Institute of Europe (Lebedeva 2013).
These centers, even if few in number, employed quite a
substantial number of researchers. In 1987, IMEMO
employed 600 scholars, and ISKAN around 150 scholars
(Schneider 1987). How influential these centers were, when
it comes to foreign policy, is still subject to debates. Some
argue that IMEMO played an instrumental role in designing
the ideational background and concrete policy options for
perestroika (Checkel 1997).17
Contemporary legal ramifications of the foreign-policy-
making process are not conducive to the participation of
non-state actors in agenda-setting or policymaking pro-
cesses. Article 86 of the Russian constitution makes the
president, rather than the government or prime minister,
responsible for Russia’s foreign and security policy. By
extension, the presidential administration is at least as
important as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign-
policy planning and implementation.
The framework of the Open Government program inau-
gurated by the then-president Dmitry Medvedev in early
2012 allowed for the creation of the Expert Council
affiliated with the government (Ekspertnyi sovet pri pravi-
telstve) and public councils linked to specific ministries
(Obshchestvennye sovety). This reform laid the institutional
foundation for knowledge exchange involving scholars,
non-academic experts, and state officials. While the Expert
Council affiliated with the government provides advice on
such areas as economic and social policy, the domain of
foreign and security policy is outside of its competences.18
No public council is linked to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.19 The minister of foreign affairs holds meetings
with the Scientific Council (Nauchnyi Sovet) to discuss
current international affairs but little information is publicly
available concerning the composition or specific tasks of
this council.20 The Council for International Law, estab-
lished in 2009 and composed of international legal scholars,
is formally affiliated with this ministry, but according to
publicly available data, it last convened in 2011.21 Once a
year, the minister of foreign affairs meets with the represen-
tatives of Russia’s not-for-profit organizations. At such a
meeting held in 2018, Sergei Lavrov described the practice
as aimed at the “exchange of views on issues of mutual
interest for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our non-
profit organizations (…).”22 A Public Council
(Obshchestvennyi Sovet) affiliated with the Ministry of
Defense has existed since 2006.23 Vladimir Putin’s third
presidential term reinforced the contrast between a relatively
rich institutional structure for knowledge exchange and offi-
cials’ growing uneasiness with expert input. The fourth term
seems to be continuing that trend, especially with the scrap-
ping of the ministerial post supervising the Open
Government initiative.24
The lack of well-developed legal ramifications is
accompanied by a relatively weak position of universities
as centers for knowledge and expertise production rather
than for teaching. While the break-up of the Soviet Union
freed Russian academia from the ideological straitjacket,
the ensuing economic decline had a profoundly negative
impact on state funding in the social sciences and the
humanities. It left these disciplines weakened materially
and in terms of status (Dubrovskiy 2017; Sokolov et al.
2015). During the 1990s, academia was largely stripped
of its elite position. Its authority was tarnished as a result
of its previous enforced intellectual entanglement with
Soviet Marxism-Leninism (Kharkhordin 2015) (R7),25
and the sudden divorce from the Soviet state ideology
caused a profound ideational void (Mäkinen 2014, 87;
Sergounin 2009). A number of hasty reforms further
undermined the status of academic expertise. Political
science, for instance, emerged largely as a result of
renaming the departments of scientific communism, rather
than according to a plan of how to advance knowledge in
that area (Golosov 2016).
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Despite the growing number of IR departments, their role
has remained focused primarily on teaching (Lebedeva
2006). Meanwhile, the institutes of the Russian Academy
of Sciences have maintained their links with the policymak-
ing world. For instance, the RAS Institute of Europe,
through an officially established position of liaison officers,
cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and pro-
vides policy briefings upon the ministry’s request (R31).
The mushrooming of think-tanks, private analytical cen-
ters, and so-called polit-tekhnologs in the 1990s blurred the
boundaries between research, advocacy, and propaganda.
Academic assessments of this phenomenon and the role of
think-tanks specializing in foreign policy vary. Most of my
interviewees agreed that the landscape is heterogeneous.
Some respondents were skeptical about the influence of
think-tanks on the policymaking process and were inclined
to describe their task as the justification and legitimization
of policy choices and decisions made by the political center
without any external input. As one respondent put it: “They
[think-tanks] are like clubs for people who pretend to be
policy-related. … They try to sense the atmosphere but their
work is like ‘steam into the whistle’” (R27). Many respon-
dents emphasized that think-tank experts play a role primar-
ily in maintaining the status quo, adapting their claims to the
political situation and following the official discourse:
“Experts sniff for demand from the Kremlin, what it is
that they want. … Think-tanks usually justify what Russia
already did” (R20); “Expertise that is close to the power
center supports the status quo” (R22). Some identified ideol-
ogy as playing a more important role than expertise for
think-tanks specializing in international politics (R5).26
The early-2000s were a period of increased demand and
supply of expertise. Economic recovery freed up resources
while the pool of experts, including with international univer-
sity experience, grew. The 2002 saw the establishment of the
journal Rossiia v globalnoi politike (Russia in Global Politics),
which aims to shape Russian expert discourse on foreign
policy and international politics in a way similar to the journal
Foreign Affairs in the United States. The Valdai Club was
inaugurated in 2004 with a mission to connect policymakers,
including top leadership, with Russian and foreign experts.
The period of the “tandem”—that is, Dmitry Medvedev’s
presidency and Vladimir Putin’s premiership during
2008–2012—opened more space for scholarly voices
(Efremenko 2017). In 2010, the Russian International
Affairs Council (RIAC) was established, and subsequently
developed a policy of cooperating with a broad pool of
experts, including academics (R30). Two factors stimulated
greater openness. First, the existence of two centers of
power resulted in a system more pluralistic and open to
external advice. Second, greater financial capabilities
allowed for the sponsoring of diverse academic initiatives.
One example is the Northern Dimension Institute, a univer-
sity network established in 2009 with the aim of informing
policies in the Baltic region. The idea for the institute
originated in the academic realm, but it necessitated the
support of foreign-policy practitioners to be implemented
as a multilateral research network (R9).27
Thanks to studies published by Russia-based scholars as
well as fieldwork-informed analysis, we know more about the
role of expertise in domestic politics (Malinova 2017; Sungurov
2015, 2017; Sungurov, Raspopov, and Beliaev 2012a, 2012b).
These analyses show that experts face a number of obstacles.
Working for domestic government structures, they have some
flexibility in their policy-oriented advice, but there is also an
implicit mutual understanding of what the limits of their auton-
omy are (Sungurov 2017, 11). Experts may also be expected to
deliver according to the “paid-for result” model (model’ opla-
chennogo rezul’tata), which means their role is reduced to
confirming and legitimizing a predetermined course of action
rather than advising on it (Sungurov 2015). Even the existence
of a legal requirement to involve independent expertise does not
prove sufficient as government structures strive to maintain
control over what experts deliver (Sungurov 2017, 12). When
it comes to the evaluation of a specific policy, “under current
Russian conditions, this evaluation, as a rule, is under control”
(Sungurov 2017, 12). Experts occupying high-level positions at
universities and the RAS (statusnye eksperty) may be restricted
in expressing their views because of wariness that excessive
criticism of the authorities might harm their institutions and
people who work there. Experts working within governmental
structures (vnutri vlastnykh struktur), tend to prioritize the
bureaucratic rule of subordination over the delivery of critical
analysis (Sungurov 2017, 12–13).28 With respect to civic
groups such as socially oriented NGOs, their expertise is har-
nessed by the government but their participation is controlled
(Owen and Bindman 2017).
With regard to Russia’s foreign policy, the literature
generally considers the influence of non-state actors, includ-
ing academia, an exception rather than a rule (Lo 2015;
Mankoff 2011; Trenin and Lo 2005). As one author puts it:
Russian authorities ignore the possibilities of dialogue with
Western political-security experts in such forums as the
Munich Security Conference, as they deem these experts com-
pletely irrelevant. Such a stance results from transposing onto the
West the way things work in Russia, where experts are not asked
about foreign policy. All that is expected from them is to justify
the foreign policy course adopted at the very top. (Gabuev 2018)
English-language studies suggest that academic impact on
foreign policy may, to some extent, be effectuated through
teaching.29 The only two aspects where the literature admits
scholars may play a more direct role, are ideational inspiration
and policy rationalization (Lo 2015, 5–7). Mezhdunarodniki,
high-profile foreign policy experts, including but not limited to
academics, are often presented as following the official line or
as the “guardians” (okhraniteli) of the regime whose motiva-
tion may vary from genuine persuasion to opportunism
(Shevtsova 2017).30 Scholarly and policy discourses have
been described as mutually constitutive (Makarychev and
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Morozov 2013, 330) or co-evolving (Omelicheva and
Zubytska 2016, 42). The view that IR scholarship in Russia
may be “policy-based evidence-making” rather than “evi-
dence-based policymaking” is quite common.31
HOW SCHOLARS VIEW THEIR IMPACT ON
FOREIGN-POLICY MAKING
Scholars employed at the Russian Academy of Sciences see
engagement with the policy world, for instance the prepara-
tion of policy briefs, as part of their obligations to their
employer (R28, R32). In contrast, university-based aca-
demics in general do not perceive their research in terms
of policy relevance, although they too may be asked to
provide research to government bodies (R17). This differ-
ence in the identification of roles may be attributed to a
traditional, but changing, division of labor between univer-
sities, which are primarily responsible for teaching, and the
RAS, charged with the task of creating and disseminating
knowledge.
Respondents agreed on a number of issues regarding the link
between scholarly knowledge and policymaking. They share the
view that the decision-making process is highly centralized and
non-transparent. Key areas of foreign-policy making are, in the
view of the interviewed scholars, handled by the Presidential
Administration rather than by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and on many occasions by the president himself. However,
scholars who have had the experience of interacting with con-
sultative bodies, like the Russian International Affairs Council,
and with foreign policy practitioners, recognize that—despite
limited room for criticism—there exist some entry points for
their expertise. They also agree that demand for and openness
toward such expertise has not been constant but rather subject to
change over time and with respect to topic areas.
Some respondents described the end of the 1990s and the
beginning of the 2000s as a “golden age” when it was
possible not only to make suggestions but also to see them
implemented in policy practice or state legislation.
References to this perceived influence have been recorded
in academic writing. For instance, Yuri Borko describes how
a team of scholars affiliated with MGIMO and RAS was
commissioned by the government and the Central Bank
with preparing a report concerning the euro currency and
Russia’s national interests (Borko and Butorina 2001).
Recommendations of this report were translated into legal
solutions (R28).
The golden age of academic expertise of the early 2000s is
usually linked to the fast pace of European integration. Not only
did the European Union (EU) introduce a single currency, but it
was about to significantly broaden its membership and dis-
cussed a constitutional treaty. It was increasingly more difficult
for bureaucrats in Russia to evaluate developments in the EU
with respect to Russia’s politics and economy. Knowledge
inside Russian legislative and executive bodies on the workings
of the EU was partial (Gretskiy, Treshchenkov, and Golubev
2014) (R28, R30). These circumstances increased the demand
for academic expertise that would be comprehensive and acces-
sible. Taking this context into account, authors working on the
first textbook on European integration intended it not only for
students but also for civil servants. The textbook prepared by
scholars from the RAS Institute of Europe andMGIMO (Borko
and Butorina 2001) was not only promoted among bureaucrats
but physically distributed to various ministries (R28).
In 2005, IR academics assessed the value of their con-
tribution to the state’s development very highly. Andrei and
Pavel Tsygankov wrote:
Without purposeful efforts of the academic community of IR
scholars, it will hardly be possible for Russia to become a
fully-fledged member of the world, nor will it be capable of
profiting from globalization, while avoiding its many traps.
(Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2005, 382)
It was at that time, however, that the evolution of Russia’s
political system started to be perceived as limiting the space
for scholarly contribution to the policymaking process. One
of the interviewed scholars provides the following
explanation:
Since the 2000s the regime has become more and more
centralized, which also means it has become less interested
in finding actual solutions to concrete problems. (R5)
Respondents recognize that policy practitioners’ openness
toward academic expertise largely depends on the particular
subject or topic at hand. Demand for experts’ advice peaked
during the process of establishing the Eurasian Economic
Union, due to the fact that its legal and institutional con-
struction was to a large extent based on the EU model:
We all advised the government on the EEU—we were tell-
ing the government how the EU worked. (R9)
Some scholars compare their positive experiences of knowl-
edge-sharing with the situation developing in the late-2000s,
when centralization and the subordination of regional decision
making to Moscow resulted in fast-dwindling demand for the
expertise on the EU at the regional governance level (R19). On
the other hand, scholars now see greater openness on the part of
regional authorities to advice concerning the Arctic (R29).
The dominant view among respondents is that the gov-
ernment is more eager to require and use expertise with
regard to the economy rather than foreign policy. Some
academics attribute this development to the fact that the
government considers foreign policy an important propa-
ganda resource. It is seemingly less precise than economics
and potential errors and misjudgments will either not be
immediately visible, can be concealed with appropriate
rhetoric or even presented as success stories (R27).
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The existence of formal channels of knowledge diffusion
does not immediately translate into impact. Respondents agree
that one of the most prevalent problems characterizing the link
between expertise and the state is the absence of feedback from
policy-makers. The following quotation is representative of this
broadly shared perception: “Who will guarantee that it will be
read by anyone” (R25). Interviewees emphasized the lack of
communication after their input had been delivered: “Your work
enters a black-box, there will be no feedback” (R30); “Once
recommendations reach the government, no one knows what
happens to them. … we don’t know how this expertise is
processed and used” (R21); “There are institutions that collect
information. Scholars do not know, however, what happens
next. … You never know how information you gather will be
used” (R25).
According to some respondents, foreign-policy practi-
tioners perceive scholarly expertise as too distant from “real
politics” and too sterile to be translated into concrete policies
(R29). Practitioners feel strongly that their participation in
diplomatic exchanges grants them a unique vantage point for
understanding foreign affairs. Academic expertise seems to be
of lesser value by the very fact that it is produced by a com-
munity that is removed from the daily practices of diplomacy.
As one scholar put it, “The government perceives the academic
knowledge as distant and irrelevant: you academics have no
idea how we really work” (R8).
In addition, a perception fairly widespread among respon-
dents is that in matters of foreign policy, the government relies
primarily on information provided by intelligence services. It is
believed that bureaucrats dealing with foreign affairs have a
preference for “first-hand” knowledge that either they them-
selves possess due to their professional engagement in diplo-
macy or that they can obtain via intelligence networks (R30). It
is possible to stipulate that bureaucrats involved in policymak-
ing and implementation share the belief that intelligence pro-
vides an accurate and true picture of events. It is the source of
reliable information that is transmitted almost in real time. Lack
of access to these sources of information automatically
diminishes the value of academic expertise in the eyes of policy
practitioners. More importantly, however, it shows that policy
practitioners may not be drawing a clear distinction between
information, analysis, and policy planning.
In the eyes of respondents, trusted individuals have a privi-
leged access to policy practitioners and are regarded as more
influential than institutions formally tasked with expert advice.
As one respondent put it: “Those who work with presidential
administration to prepare, for instance, large economic or poli-
tical fora are not recruited in an open competition; this is by
invitation only” (R25). Respondents perceive that expertise has
become personalized, with particular individuals having better
reputation than an entire institution. One interviewee sought the
roots of this personalization in the early 1990s, when institu-
tional patterns of communication between scholars and the
Communist Party broke down and politicians started relying
on personal connections (R6).
IMPACT: THE SPECTRUM OF OPINIONS
In addition to aspects of policy impact that scholars agree on,
there are certain issues on which the views of respondents
diverge and oscillate between highly skeptical and cautiously
optimistic. These views can be classified into four groups and
illustrated with the help of a simple graph (see Figure 1).
No Foreign-Policy Process, Hence No Impact
The most skeptical view expressed by respondents who
admitted they had never had contact with policy practitioners
is that no policymaking process takes place in Russia. As a
result, there can be no possibility for scholarly contribution of
any kind (R27). These scholars see foreign-policy making as
limited to state officials and openly excluding societal actors
such as think-tanks, experts, and academics. This skeptical
view rests on the assumption that, if there is only one decision
maker, we should discount processes that are usually involved
in the elaboration of specific policies, including agenda setting
and the discussion of key goals and ways of achieving them
(R8, R27, R33).
No Impact, Only Justification of Policy
Some respondents opine that academics are often required to
step in to fill in policy slogans with content rather than invited to
participate in the process of policy formulation. This, according
to one respondent, was the case with Dmitry Medvedev’s
security doctrine proposed in 2008 and the European Security
Treaty presented in 2009 (R32). Some experts may have a role
in adding new terms to the overall vocabulary, but without
much influence on the substance of actual policies that would
follow their introduction. One respondent described this activity
as throwing in new terminology (vbrasyvat’ novye terminy)
(R32). Academics recognize that having a role in the creation
of discourse is not equal to actual foreign-policymaking. It may,
however, as some observe, indirectly contribute to identity
No foreign policy process, hence no impact
No impact, only justification of policy
Unwillingness to have impact
Impact possible under certain conditions
FIGURE 1 The spectrum of views concerning potential impact of scho-
larly expertise on foreign policy.
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building, especially if these terms aim to position Russia on the
world stage in a specific way.
Unwilling to Have Impact
Another group of respondents considers impact possible but
consciously withdraws from participation. There are at least
two reasons scholars provide for this approach. Some perceive
that the claim to authority in the academic realm hinges upon
their successful presentation as objective and apolitical
(R17).32 They see any engagement with policymaking as
dangerously undermining their objectivity. These scholars are
not interested in providing expertise, on the grounds that
thinking in terms of policy impact would harm or contaminate
science (R17, R26). For others, impact and policy advice are
simply not considered worthy of academic engagement. These
scholars prefer to invest their efforts either in teaching or in
scholarly production. Some aim for international academic
recognition rather than for policy impact:
Due to the fact that Soviet social sciences lagged behind
(otstavanie sotsialnykh nauk), it is now appreciated when
people get recognition in the West. This is why we con-
stantly think what type of research will be interesting for
other scholars and not for policymakers. (R24)
There are also those who see providing policy advice as
primarily directed at self-promotion. As one interviewee put
it: “If experts or academics work with politicians, this means
they themselves want to become politicians, deputies or
work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (R1).
An important reason for avoiding engagement with
the policymaking process is its lack of transparency.
One interviewee described a case he was familiar with
where a non-academic with no particular knowledge of a
region or its languages was commissioned with writing
an expert report on the region’s politics. The respondent
described it as an instance of corruption, benefiting the
commissioning civil servant, the intermediary, and the
provider of “expert analysis” (R33).
Finally, a few scholars decline participation on the
grounds that the political system currently in place is
not one they would like to assist with the use of their
data or knowledge. They withdraw because they are
critical of the undemocratic outlook of contemporary
politics in Russia (R8, R35).
Impact Possible under Certain Conditions
The less skeptical attitude recognizes that IR scholars
usually share the ambition to have some leverage in the
realm of foreign policy. In this group, the willingness to
have impact goes hand in hand with the realization of
obstacles. Some scholars are caught between their desire
to contribute and the awareness of the limited room for
their expertise. One respondent put it in the following way:
It is not that criticizing current state policies has become
impossible. It is just that such a critical voice is effectively
muted, it does not exist. If it tries to re-appear, it gets criticized
as unpatriotic. This is why there is little desire to offer alter-
natives.… Don’t rock the boat (ne podryvat’ lodku)…; don’t
meddle with identity questions (ne vmeshivat’sia v voprosy
identichnosti). … Rather than criticize, the academic sphere
is expected to adjust (podstroivat’ ne kritikovat’). (R3)
Growing intolerance of the state toward criticism of
foreign policy narrows down the avenues for scholarly
engagement and limits their potential input: “Following
the official line is more important than genuine expertise
grounded in data analysis” (R4). However, a group of
respondents that does not feel paralyzed by those diffi-
cult circumstances maintains that although policymaking
is highly centralized, there are ways to participate and
contribute meaningfully to this process. This group
agrees that participation is possible only under certain
conditions:
You need to find the appropriate level in order to bring some
value added. It needs to be bigger than day-to-day operatio-
nalization of foreign policy, where you cannot compete with
bureaucrats and intelligence. Neither can it be too general;
your advice needs to be possible to operationalize. (R30)
Other elements to consider in order to gain impact are
identifying the most appropriate topic and assessing potential
demand. One interviewee distinguished clearly between follow-
ing the official line and fitting into the official agenda, suggest-
ing that while the former is not desirable, the latter is key (R39).
Timing is considered crucial when planning to contribute,
which is illustrated by the following interview excerpts:
With the action in Syria in 2017, all decision-makers have
thought that it is the culmination and Russia’s success. But it
turned out that there is no endgame in sight, we have no exit
strategy. It is then when bureaucrats became more open to
outside ideas. (R30)
Academic knowledge matters only when it is timely and
when specific ideas fit the hot agenda. (R39)
Respondents consider that a window of opportunity may also
open in advance of a high-level state visit or summit as well as
when a new government is elected in a country deemed
important to Russia’s foreign policy. The format of the con-
tribution is key: ‘The higher you go, the shorter your brief
should be. This is art in its own right, to be short but sub-
stantive’ (R30).
It is also crucial to identify the right entry point:
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This is not always the highest level, because top-level decision-
makers may simply delegate the issue to someone else and you
lose track of it. The thing may as well disappear from the
agenda altogether. You have to find the right recipients. (R30)
In addition, demand for expert knowledge may arise
when the state administration is faced with an entirely
new, unexpected and complex situation or when scenarios
it had planned fail. The recent instances include the euro
crisis and the migration crisis in the EU (R28).
Respondents who want to have impact are willing to prag-
matically use tactics that have proven effective in drawing
practitioners’ attention. For instance, when proposing a new
idea, it is considered important to refer to a statement by
president Putin on a given matter. As one interviewee con-
fessed: “To do this successfully I needed tomake a reference to
what Vladimir Putin had said” (R9). Such strategic quoting is
seen as necessary to persuade lower and mid-level bureaucrats
not to dismiss ideas straight away (R9).
At the same time, scholars recognize that their role is
difficult because, in their view, foreign-policy practi-
tioners have a simplified view of academic expertise:
“Foreign-policy practitioners regard International
Relations as a new discipline that is excessively influ-
enced by Western ideas” (R19).
Another group of scholars views expertise delivery in
economic terms. Expertise they provide needs to “sell,”
which also means it needs to respond to specific
demand. They act as “entrepreneurial subjects,” to bor-
row Natalie Koch’s phrase (Koch 2016). For them, gain-
ing entry into the policymaking process and the
provision of expertise for the state is necessary to keep
their institutions afloat in budgetary terms, especially if
the institution in question has no permanent line of
financing:
Every year I need to find clients for my expertise. I never do
what is interesting for us, but what is interesting for the govern-
ment. These sometimes overlap. The MFA [Ministry of Foreign
Affairs] has its own center of analysis and we need to offer
something unique. This is tightly linked to my budget. (R39)
The interviews show a wide spectrum of attitudes concern-
ing impact. Opinions diverge on demand and the actual use of
expertise. While generally skeptical, some scholars are con-
vinced that achieving impact is impossible. Some declare
unwillingness to interact with the policymaking world, and
others find providing expert advice difficult but possible under
certain conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has discussed the role of IR expertise and the
academia–policy nexus in contemporary Russia. While in
many university cultures across Europe, ensuring some
relevance of IR scholarship has become a rarely questioned
paradigm, to academics in Russia the policy relevance of
their work is at best a secondary concern. Scholars share the
view that the decision-making process is highly centralized
and non-transparent. The most skeptically inclined argue
that there can be no meaningful contribution due to the
fact that foreign-policy making is centered around the figure
of the president. Ambiguity on the part of scholars with
respect to the policy impact of their work may be attributed
to several factors, in particular: (i) the authority of academia
as a source of expertise eroded following the break-up of the
Soviet Union and the difficulties it faced during the 1990s;
(ii) the lack of a policy-impact culture and mechanisms
designed to stimulate it; (iii) prevalence of the ethos of
scientific activity as detached from the realm of policymak-
ing, mirrored by foreign-policy practitioners’ belief that
scholarly research is insufficiently related to “real politics”;
(iv) a broader political context that stimulates reluctance on
the part of some scholars to engage in “political activity”
that might potentially endanger their career; (v) scholars’
unwillingness to be seen as assisting the state whose system
of governance they do not support; (vi) the perception that
scholarly expertise may be ignored or manipulated.
Those less skeptical recognize that there exists some
room for their expertise and try to identify entry points.
For this group the key challenge is that foreign-policy
practitioners find it difficult to recognize “external” sources
of knowledge on international affairs. Bureaucrats, consid-
ering foreign affairs to be their bread and butter, are dis-
missive of expertise coming from outside of their own
circle. Their preference is—in the view of some intervie-
wees—for information delivered by intelligence services. A
popular perception among Russian scholars is that policy
practitioners value and trust particular individuals and rely
on personal ties more than on formal links with academic
institutions. The negative side is that those individuals have
to constantly prove their trustworthiness and loyalty, which
prevents them from articulating criticism.
Those who study the gap between academia and foreign
policy in the United States have observed that it has been
successfully bridged in many ways, either through the gov-
ernment contracting research or through the mechanism of
the “revolving door” between universities and the executive
branch. However, studies also note that academics seeking
tenure may not be willing to devote time to government
service and many do not wish to be identified with official
policies or to be exploited for political purposes (Newsom
1995, 66–67), especially for fear of losing intellectual integ-
rity (Parks and Stern 2014, 74). On the basis of the con-
ducted interviews, it is possible to say that these concerns
are familiar to scholars in Russia.
Certain “technical” requirements for gaining access to
policy practitioners may be similar in both the United
States and Russia, for instance the necessity to write in a
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short and accessible form, the right timing, the ability to
provide quick responses to unexpected events, and readiness
to address policy failures (Byman and Kroenig 2016,
305–9). Specific obstacles to scholarly impact on foreign-
policy making are also comparable, in particular scholars’
lack of familiarity with the peculiar needs of the foreign-
policy bureaucracy and the government’s vested interest in a
policy it had initiated (Byman and Kroenig 2016, 299;
Newsom 1995, 55).
While the analysis of the Russian case shows some
similarities with issues raised in literature on foreign-
policy analysis in the United States, it is nonetheless
necessary to take into account a different sociopolitical
context. Despite the fact that Russian authorities expect
universities to upgrade their position in international
rankings, they do not seem eager to broaden their reli-
ance on academic knowledge. On the contrary, many
activities of the Russian state have pushed scholars
toward greater caution rather than motivated them to
share their knowledge. In such a context, providing
advice in a form accessible to policy practitioners may
be the least of scholarly concerns. Academics share the
perception of undervaluing their expertise. Their wari-
ness of expressing too much criticism publicly may lead
to further separation of academic experts from the pol-
icymaking world.
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NOTES
1 See Boswell (2009) for an overview. The thesis about the existence
of two completely separate communities—academics, and policy-
makers—continues to be challenged by new research (e.g.,
Newman, Cherney, and Head 2016).
2 See, for example, requirements for the Horizon-2020 program and
ISA Research Workshop Grants.
3 For a discussion of this problematique in Soviet times, see Polsky
(1987).
4 See also the results of a recent field research analysis concerning the
role and influence of civic actors on specific policy processes in
Russia (Owen and Bindman 2017).
5 In conformity with the ethical requirements of this research, all my
interviews were carried out on the principle of anonymity. The
interviews were not recorded and the quotations I provide are derived
from hand-written notes. I reference my interviews in such a way that
no one person can be identified by the date of the meeting or their
workplace. To differentiate between the interviews, respondents are
marked with a code symbol (R1–R40).
6 In some cases the interviewee and I used both languages to make
sure we both meant the same thing.
7 “Putin postavil zadachu provyshat’sotsial’nyi status rabotnikov
nauki” [Putin Set the Task to Raise the Social Status of Science
Workers], ITAR-TASS, April 10, 2018, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/
607801 (if not otherwise indicated, all links last accessed on April
11, 2018).
8 Presidential address delivered on the national day of science, February
8, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56825.
9 The project’s webpage listing aims and expected results: http://
5top100.com/about/more-about/. The project is overseen by the
Council on Competitiveness Enhancement of Leading Russian
Universities among Global Research and Education Centers, http://
5top100.com/council/.
10 On Turkey, see “As Turkey’s Academia Faces Desolation, a Call for
Solidarity with Imperiled Scholars” https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/as-turkeys-academia-faces-desolation-a-call-for-solidarity_us_
58cc8fe8e4b0537abd9570d5 and “Rectors Condemn Attack on
Academic Freedom in Turkey,” EUPRIO Blog, 27 July 2016,
http://www.euprio.eu/rectors-condemn-attack-on-academic-freedom-
in-turkey/. In China, Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, was reported as
saying that universities must become the Communist party “strong-
holds” (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/china-uni
versities-must-become-communist-party-strongholds-says-xi-jinp
ing). On Tajikistan, see Schatz and Heathershaw (2018).
11 Cases include: the court decision of 2017 to put Kirill
Serebrennikov, an internationally acclaimed film and theater direc-
tor under house arrest for alleged embezzlement (Amos 2017;
Ayres 2017) and the 2018 decision to revoke the distribution
license for a British-made historical satire, The Death of Stalin.
(See also Antonova 2017 and Damberg 2017.) The most recent
Annual Report of the Network of Concerned Historians listed
cases of censorship of historical research and cultural production
in Russia (http://www.concernedhistorians.org/content_files/file/
AR/18.pdf, last accessed July 30, 2018).
12 For the text of the law, see https://rg.ru/2012/07/23/nko-dok.html.




14 Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann described her own experience
on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DhwLJ2dn0A.
15 News reports: https://indicator.ru/news/2018/02/05/premiya-prezi
denta-rf-v-oblasti-nauki-i-innovacij/ and https://philologist.livejour
nal.com/10046998.html.
16 These grants are open to Russian and foreign scholars. In 2017,
the award was granted to a US-based scholar, William Wohlforth,
for a project implemented with MGIMO. For news reports on awards
granted in 2017, see http://tass.ru/nauka/4825460 and https://indica
tor.ru/news/2017/11/30/pobediteli-shestogo-konkursa-megagrantov/.
17 See also a series of articles on the history of IMEMO, published by
Petr Cherkasov in the journalMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye
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otnosheniia since the early 2000s. On relations between IMEMO and
Moscow State University (MGU), see Polsky (1987, 101).
18 The official webpage of the Open Government framework is at http://
open.gov.ru/expert_sovet/.
19 For a list of councils, see http://open.gov.ru/os/os/.
20 For an example of such a meeting, see http://www.mid.ru/foreign_
policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2313196,
last accessed 3 October 2018.
21 The official webpage of the Council for International Law http://
www.mid.ru/activity/coordinating_and_advisory_body/international_
law_council.
22 A speech by Sergei Lavrov is available at http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/
meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/
content/id/3260122 (last accessed on September 13, 2018).
23 This particular Council was established following a presidential
decree of 4 August 2006. Its aims are described at the official
webpage: https://function.mil.ru/function/public_board.htm (last
accessed on September 13, 2018).
24 Putin Signs Decrees on Appointing New Russian Cabinet Members,
18 May 2018, http://tass.com/politics/1005075 (last accessed on July
30, 2018).
25 See also a critique of the forms of intellectual production in Soviet
humanities and social sciences (Kharkhordin 2015) and a discussion
of academic freedom in Soviet times (Dubrovskiy 2017).
26 These assessments confirm the findings of a recent report on Russian
think-tanks (Pallin and Oxenstierna 2017), which concluded that
while the community of think-tanks is diverse, a significant number
conveys official narratives promoted by the Russian state.
27 The Institute’s webpage: http://www.northerndimension.info/con
tacts/northern-dimension-institute
28 Sungurov adds that expertise delivered by ‘independent’ experts is
best divided into two parts: that delivered by ‘niche’ and ‘uni-
versal’ experts (Sungurov 2017). The former have knowledge and
experience of a certain issue that may be required by the state at
the stage of devising a specific policy. The latter group is labeled
as ‘TV political analysts’ (telepolitologi), which is to denote their
availability and harmlessness. They can be summoned to provide
a commentary that would be neither underpinned by specific
knowledge of the topic nor implicate or ridicule decision-makers
(Sungurov 2017, 12).
29 For instance, it has been argued that geopolitics teaching at universities
in Russia provides knowledge that may be used by students in their
future careers (Grenier and Hagmann 2016, Mäkinen 2017, 297).
30 The term mezhdunarodniki (literally an internationalist) as denoting
foreign policy and international relations experts emerged in the
early-1960s. Before, it referred to party activists whose task was
social outreach and explaining to the public the communist party
line on international matters (Zimmerman 1969, 43-44).
31 It was expressed, for example, in the question and answer sessions at
the British International Studies Association, BISA annual confer-
ence in Bath 2018.
32 The concept of “politicization” has been used very often recently in
Russian public discourse and appeared also in interviews. My impres-
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